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Abstract
In this study I analyze how skill biased technical change(SBTC),
union bargain power and institutions aﬀect deunionization.
The results show that SBTC, union "eﬀective" bargain power and
legal and institutional changes can explain deunionization. SBTC
explains deunionization because the increase in productivity towards
the skilled workers increases their competitive wage above the union
wage. Regarding, the union "eﬀective" bargain power, an increase in
union demands to extract more rents from ﬁrms, incentives ﬁrms to
react strongly and avoid union existence to increase their proﬁts. Legal
and political institutional changes against unions cause deunionization
because it increases the union formation costs.
Simulations based on the model support the ﬁndings described
above.
Resumo
Este trabalho analisa como o avanço tecnológico viesado (ATV), o
poder de barganha dos sindicatos e as instituições afetam a dessindi-
calização.
Os resultados mostram que o ATV, o poder de barganha efetivo
e mudanças institucionais podem explicar a queda dos sindicatos.
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1O ATV explica esta queda porque o aumento de produtividade dos
agentes mais capacitados eleva o seu salário competitivo acima do
salário do sindicato. Uma maior extração de renda, através do poder
de barganha efetivo, incentiva a ﬁrma a mudar suas decisões de em-
prego para elevar seus lucros. Mudanças institucionais afetam os sindi-
catos através de um aumento nos seus custos de formação. Simulações
do modelo dão suporte a estas conclusões.
Palavras-Chave: Dessindicalização, Poder de Barganha, Avanço
Tecnológico Viesado.
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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, the US and UK economies observed a ﬁerce
decrease in the rate of unionized workers related to the total of workers in
the economy. In the late 70’s, the rate of unionized workers was 30% in the
U.S. while in 2000 it was only 14% (Farber and Western, 2000). Regarding
the UK, this rate was above 55% and drops to below 30% in the same period
(Machin, 2000, 2002).
The literature has been using three diﬀerent hypotheses to explain this
reduction of unionization.
The ﬁrst one states that the fall of unionization is due to a change in the
economy’s composition towards the increase in the services sectors, where
unions were not strong, and away from the industrial sectors, where unions
were traditionally stronger (Dickens and Leonard, 1985). Farber and Krueger
(1992) estimated that compositional eﬀects can account for at most one quar-
ter of this decline.
A second hypothesis relates this deunionization to changes in the legal and
political system, moving away from unions. Key facts related to this are the
1981 air-traﬃc controller strike and the Reagan’s labor board appointments
in 1983 (Farber and Western, 2001) for the US and the Thatcher government
in the UK.
The third one justiﬁes the deunionization due to the action of market
forces, which increase the tensions among the workers inside the unions and
beyond its breaking point.
2In this same period of analysis (the last two decades), there was an in-
crease in the wage inequality in both countries. The ratio of the 90th to 10th
percentile of male weekly wages was 2.7 and 2.4, in 1980, rising to 3.5 and
3.1 in 1990, in both US and UK, respectively.
Skill biased technical change(SBTC) is a well-accepted explanation for
this increase in wage inequality. Katz and Murphy (1992) claim that SBTC
combined with a smaller growth in the skilled workers’ supply is the main
cause in the increase in wage inequality. As unions are well recognized as
wage compression agents, the drop in the unions can also account for some
of the increase in this inequality during the period.
Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001) analyze unions as rent-seeking
agents imposing a contract on the ﬁrm or as eﬃciency-enhancing unions,
where the union induces training to the workers, or provides insurance to
themselves. Their study makes use of the skill biased technical change as the
driving force that generates deunionization because it increases the outside
option of skilled workers.
This paper contributes to the existing literature for the following rea-
sons: 1) Presents a stochastic general equilibrium model that incorporates
an endogenous union formation and union membership decision. 2) Joins
two diﬀerent hypotheses presented in the literature to explain deunioniza-
tion: changes in the legal and political system and market forces through
skill biased technical change. 3) Presents a new market force explanation:
ﬁrms’ reaction to union "eﬀective" bargain power.
It is shown that the presence of SBTC, unions high "eﬀective" bargain
power and institutional changes against unions may cause deunionization.
The former because the increase towards the skilled workers productivity
increases their outside option above the wage paid by the union. The second
due to the ﬁrms reactions against unions in order to increase their proﬁts.
And the latter because this changes increase union formation costs.
This paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the model.
It starts describing the economy: the preferences, the endowment and the
technology. Then I present the timing of the actions, describe the bargaining
game between the ﬁrms and the union, solve the model and deﬁne the equi-
librium. Section 3 shows some comparative statics of how skill bias technical
change, union "eﬀective" bargain power and legal and political institutional
changes aﬀect the union membership. Section 4 shows the algorithm used
to solve the problem and also presents some simulations. Finally, section 5
sums up with the concluding remarks.
32 The Model
The present model incorporates a decreasing returns to scale (DRS) sector
that interacts in a large economy. In this DRS sector, ﬁrms choose their
level of employment competitively, taking the wages as given. The workers
are divided in two distinct groups with diﬀerent productivity: skilled and
unskilled workers. Both groups supply labor inelastically.
A union exists when the total rents that it extracts from the ﬁrm is higher
than a stochastic unionization cost c. This cost c can be interpreted as an
institutional cost that unions face when they are being organized. Moreover,
the workers may decide to join the union or not through the comparison
between the outside option of the workers and the union wage. If their
outside option is higher they do not join the union, otherwise they do.
2.1 Preferences, Endowment and Technology
Workers have a utility function given by U(c) that has the usual properties:
U′(c) > 0 , U′′(c) < 0 and the Inada conditions hold.
The economy is endowed with a continuum of workers N divided in two
groups: skilled (Ns) and unskilled (Nu). Both groups supply 1 unit of la-
bor inelastically. The skilled workers have a higher productivity than the
unskilled.
The model represents a DRS sector that interacts in a larger economy.
There is no storage technology. Therefore, the households have instantaneous
utility given by: U (c) = U (w).
The ﬁrms have a decreasing returns to scale technology given by a pro-
duction function F(ns,nu), where ns represents the number of skilled workers
used in production and nu the number of unskilled workers. This production
function has F ′ > 0 and F” < 0 in both arguments. I also assume that both
workers are essential to production.
We assume that unions are coalitions of workers that bargain together
for a unique wage. Basically, unions are rent extractors. They extract rents
from the ﬁrms to the workers.
The unionization cost c is a random variable and is distributed by G(c),
where: GC(c) = Pr(C ≤ c). Each ﬁrm will face a diﬀerent c, therefore we
use the notation ci to indicate the unionization cost faced by ﬁrm i for each
4worker that it employs. The total cost(Ci) faced by ﬁrm i is the following:
Ci = ci.(ns + nu).
This unionization cost represents the institutional costs to organize a
union1. Therefore, any institutional change designed to aﬀect unions nega-
tively reﬂects an increase in C.
2.2 Timing
The model has the following time: 1) Firms decide to enter the sector. 2)
The unionization cost ci is observed. 3) The hiring decision takes place. 4)
Workers decide to form a union or not. 5) The bargain between the union
and ﬁrm occurs. 6) Production and consumption take place.
We solve the model using backwards induction. It is assumed that the
agents have perfect forecast. Our ﬁrst analysis regards the bargaining be-
tween the ﬁrms and the unions. Once we know the wages negotiated by the
unions, the agents decide their membership status in the union through the
comparison of the competitive wages and the union wage.
The ﬁrms decide their level of employment with the knowledge that it
can aﬀect the union wage. Therefore, it incorporates this information in its
maximization problem.
2.3 The bargain between the union and ﬁrm
The union can be formed if the rent extracted from the ﬁrm is higher than its
random creation cost, Ci. Therefore, in order to analyze whether the rents
are higher than the costs, one needs to describe the bargaining process and
the possible outcomes.
There are two agents in this bargain: ﬁrms and unions. The latter repre-
sents the workers interests and aims to extract rents that increase the workers
wages. The model presents a Nash bargain where the agents split-the diﬀer-
ence of their "output ". In this kind of bargaining, the outside options are
important because it aﬀects the negotiations as threat points.
The outside option of the ﬁrm is to produce an output that gives a proﬁt
equal to γπ (ws,wu), where γ < 1 , i.e., once an agreement is not reached,
the ﬁrm will suﬀer a loss (1 − γ)π(ws,wu). The outside option of the union
is the wage amount that its members would receive if they were not members
1For example, organize ellections, legal costs and so on.
5of the union, i.e., the sum of the competitive wages paid in non-unionized
ﬁrms.
Once negotiations break down, there are no further negotiations, and
both agents leave with their outside options.
Deﬁnition 1: A union is a coalition of workers that bargains for the same
wage ￿ w.
The bargain between the ﬁrms and the unions is a Nash bargain where
the unions have a bargain power β and γ is the fraction of the proﬁt that
the ﬁrm can obtain in case of a failure in the negotiations.
β [F(ns,nu) − ￿ w(ns + nu) − γπ (ws,wu)] = (1−β)[￿ w(ns+nu)−(nsws+nuwu)]
(1)
If negotiations fail, the workers can impose a (1 − γ) loss on the ﬁrm. It
can be viewed as a lack of eﬀort to the workers or any externality that they




{[β(1 − γ)π(ns,nu)] + nsws + nuwu} (2)
The bargained wage (2) is the total competitive wage paid by a ﬁrm to its
workers plus the rents extracted from the ﬁrms divided between the workers.
The rent extracted is: R = β(1 − γ)π (ns,nu).
Equation 2 shows us that the higher the bargain power of the union, the
higher the bargained wage. And the higher the punishment imposed on the
ﬁrm ( the lower γ), the higher the bargained wages. Therefore, we can call
β(1 − γ) as the "eﬀective union bargain power".
2.3.1 Bargain only with the unskilled worker
When the union bargains only for the unskilled workers, the bargained wage
is:
￿ wu = wu +
1
nu
[βu(1 − γu)π (ws,wu)] (3)
As can be seen in (3), the unskilled worker will always beneﬁt joining
the union because he receives a higher wage (￿ w or ￿ wu) than the competitive
one(wu).
6To have that, the bargained wage when all the workers join the union is
bigger than the one when only unskilled workers decide to join the union.
Therefore, the following condition has to be satisﬁed:










When the bargained wage with both skilled and unskilled workers in
the union is smaller than the one bargained by unskilled workers only, the
unskilled workers will prefer to bargain alone2.
2.4 Workers decision
The workers choose to join the union or not. They join the union whenever
it gives them higher wages3. Therefore, the skilled and unskilled workers,
face the following problem when deciding to be a union member or not:
￿ w ≥ ws (5)
￿ w ≥ wu (6)
The right hand side of equation (5) is higher than the one in equation
(6), given that ws > wu. Therefore, there is a higher chance for the skilled
worker not to join the union than for the unskilled.
2.5 Firms Optimum Employment Decision
As in this model the ﬁrms have perfect forecast of the union wage, they can
take advantage of that in their objective function. Therefore, they replace
the union wage in their proﬁt function:
￿ π(￿ w) = F(ns,nu)−(ns + nu) ￿ w = [1−β(1−γ)][F(ns,nu)−nsws−nuwu] (7)
￿ π(￿ w) = ￿ π (ws,wu) = [1 − β(1 − γ)]π (ws,wu) (8)
2Once we assume that βu < β and that γu > γ, the wage bargained with both type of
workers will be higher than the one bargained only by unskilled workers.
3In the present model, the only beneﬁt that unions oﬀer is a higher wage.
7As can be seen, this is the neoclassical proﬁt function(π(ws,wu)) scaled
down by [1 − β(1 − γ)]. This implies that when the ﬁrms maximize this
function, their choice of employment will be the same one as the ﬁrms that
do not interact with unions. But their proﬁts are reduced.
As ﬁrms may operate under the presence of unions, they must choose their
level of employment taking into account that ﬁrms’ proﬁts may be reduced.
Therefore, depending on the union formation cost faced by the ﬁrm(ci), it
may choose diﬀerent levels of employment. Thus, the choice of labor may
depend on ci, i.e., the ﬁrms will choose level of employment (ns (ci),nu(ci)).
2.5.1 The Problem
We can divide the employment decision in three diﬀerent regions.
In region 1, no union can be formed because the cost is too high. In this
region the employment decision is {ns(ci),nu(ci)} = {n∗
s,n∗
u}.
The second region is a region where the ﬁrm has an employment choice
{￿ ns (ci),￿ nu(ci)}  = {n∗
s,n∗
u} that exclude unions because the costs are higher
than the rents and gives a higher proﬁt than [1 − β(1 − γ)]π(ws,wu,n∗
s,n∗
u).
The third is the one where the ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt by choosing
{ns(ci),nu(ci)} = {n∗
s,n∗
u},because the unionization cost ci is too low.
As can be noted, the choice of employment depends on the unionization
cost ci that is a random variable. Therefore, the employment choice{ns,nu}
is a function of c, {ns(ci),nu(ci)}.
In order to use the reasoning described above, let’s deﬁne c and c. The














The value c is the one for which we have: [1−β(1−γ)]π(ws,wu,n∗
s,n∗
u) =
π(ws,wu,￿ ns (ci),￿ nu (ci)) and at the same time we have that ￿ ns (ci),￿ nu (ci)
maximize β(1−γ)π(ws,wu,￿ ns (ci),￿ nu (ci)) = (￿ ns (ci) + ￿ nu (ci))ci
4. From this
last equality we obtain c :
4If ￿ ns (c),￿ nu (c) do not maximize β(1−γ)π(ws,wu,￿ ns (c),￿ nu (c)) = (￿ ns (c) + ￿ nu (c))c,
I have multiple combinations of ￿ ns (c),￿ nu (c) that make [1 −β(1 −γ)]π(ws,wu,n∗
s,n∗
u) =
π(ws,wu,￿ ns (c),￿ nu (c)).
And more, the ﬁrm choice of ￿ ns (c) + ε,￿ nu (c) + ε would not necessarily maximize the
ﬁrms proﬁt, given ci.
8c =
β(1 − γ)π(ws,wu,￿ ns (c),￿ nu(c))
(￿ ns (c) + ￿ nu(c))
(10)
The problem of the ﬁrm is to choose ns(c),nu(c) to max{π(w),π(￿ w)}.




s.t. β(1 − γ)π(ws,wu,ns (c),nu (c)) ≤ (ns (c) + nu (c))c
π(￿ w) = max
ns(c),nu(c)
[1 − β(1 − γ)]π (ws,wu,ns (c),nu (c))
When ﬁrms are in region 1, they employ ns(ci) = n∗
s, nu(ci) = n∗
u and
make proﬁts equal to π(ws,wu,n∗
s,n∗
u). This happens because when ci > c
the constraint in π(w) is not binding. Therefore, ﬁrms act in the same way
as a competitive ﬁrm does5.
In region 2, where ci ∈ (c,c), the constraint in π(w) is binding. Here, the
employment choice depends directly on the value of ci because the total rents
that can be extracted by the union may be higher than its formation cost for
some employment choice. For example, if a ﬁrm employs (ns(ci),nu(ci)) =
(n∗
s,n∗





fore, it is possible for the union to exist and extract rents from the ﬁrm.
On the other hand, the best employment choice for the ﬁrm is to pick an
(￿ ns(c) + ε,￿ nu(c) + ε) that gives a proﬁt level π(ws,wu,￿ ns(c) + ε,￿ nu(c) +
ε) > [1 − β(1 − γ)]π(ws,wu,n∗
s,n∗
u). And at the same time we have that
β(1−γ)π(ws,wu,￿ ns(c)+ε,￿ nu(c)+ε) < (￿ ns(c) + ￿ nu(c) + 2ε)ci. In this region
the ﬁrm chooses an employment that gives the higher possible proﬁt. A con-
sequence of this choice is that it excludes the possibility of union existence.
As can be seen in the latter case, the bigger is β(1−γ), the union "eﬀec-
tive" bargain power, the larger the loci of points that the ﬁrm can choose to
avoid the unions and increase its proﬁts. This is very intuitive because the
more the union "hurts "the ﬁrm, the more the ﬁrm react.
5The competitive ﬁrms solve the following problem: maxns,nu π(ws,wu) = F(ns,nu)−
nsws − nuwu.
The standard solution of the above equation is the following:ws = F1(ns,nu) and wu =
F2 (ns,nu).
9In region 3 we have that ci < c. Here, the ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts
in the union’s presence, because if it chooses (ns (c),nu (c)) that maximizes
π(w), the value obtained will be equal to [1−β(1−γ)]π(ws,wu,n∗
s,n∗
u) by the
deﬁnition of c. Any value ci < c that gives a solution to π(w), (ns (c),nu (c))
will give a proﬁt π(ws,wu,￿ ns(c)+ε,￿ nu(c)+ε) < [1−β(1−γ)]π(ws,wu,n∗
s,n∗
u).
The ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt by choosing the pair (ns (c),nu (c)) = (n∗
s,n∗
u)




As this DRS sector is interacting in a larger economy, we have the following
free entry condition:
κ = Et[π(ws,wu)] (11)
where κ is the entry cost of a new factory in the sector and E is the expec-
tation taken over the possible realizations of the unionization cost.
Thus, the free entry condition(11) states that the expected proﬁt in this
DRS sector must equal to the cost that the entrant has to pay. It means that
ﬁrms enter this sector while the expected return is higher than the entrance
cost, κ. The right hand side of the above equation falls with the increase
of m, the number of ﬁrms. The reduction in ns,nu per ﬁrm, caused by an
increase in the number of ﬁrms, increases wages and then reduces the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts.
2.7 Equilibrium
Deﬁnition 2: Given the stochastic process GC(c) = Pr(C ≤ c), an equilib-
rium in this economy is a price system (￿ w,ws,wu) and an allocation
(ns(c),nu(c),m) such that:
1) Firms maximize their proﬁt choosing (ns(c),nu(c)) and workers act op-
timally deciding to be a member of the union or not.
2) Markets clear: Ns =
￿m
i=1 ns(ci) and Nu =
￿m
i=1 nu(ci).
3) m is the number of ﬁrms in the sector, i.e., the number of ﬁrms that
satisfy the free entry condition, κ = Et[π(ws,wu)].
103 Comparative Statics
In this section, I study how skill biased technical change, union eﬀective
bargain power and institutional changes aﬀects unions.
3.1 Skill Biased Technical Change
Skill biased technical change is an introduction of new technologies that
increases the productivity gap between skilled and unskilled workers. Thus,
when this new technology is introduced it gives wages advantages to the
skilled workers. In the union context, this technology development gives
productivity advantages to the skilled workers, who may wish not to join the
unions due to the possibility of a better payment outside the union.
In order to see how this eﬀect can happen, we will adopt the following
nonseparable production function: F (ns,nu) = Anα
sn1−α−θ
u .
In this production function, an increase in A represents an increase in
the total productivity and it aﬀects both workers productivity in a similar
way. However, one of the aspects of the skill biased technical change is
the asymmetric eﬀect that it has over the productivities of individuals with
diﬀerent skills. Skill biased technical change in this framework will be an
increase in α.
How a change in technology aﬀects the workers decision towards the
unions? Using this production function, we obtain ws, wu and ￿ w. This


















u − nsws − wunu] + nsws + nuwu} (14)
In order to analyze who joins the union, let’s observe the net beneﬁt of
joining it. Let Zi be the net beneﬁt of worker i = s,u, where s denotes skilled





u [β(1 − γ)θ − α
nu
ns
+ (1 − α − θ)] (15)
11When Zs = 0, we are able to obtain the α value that makes the skilled





[β(1 − γ)θ + (1 − θ)] (16)
Now that we know the threshold value α∗ let’s study the behavior of Zs
for the diﬀerent values of α.
dZs
dα






∗) > 0 (17)
Therefore, once we have that 17 is satisﬁed, Zs is positive before α∗ and
negative after7.









When Zu = 0, we are able to obtain the α value that makes the unskilled
worker indiﬀerent between being in the union or not.




[φs(c)Ns (1 − θ) − φu(c)Nuβ(1 − γ)θ]
(19)
Following the same steps for the unskilled worker we have:
dZu
dα






∗∗) > 0 (20)
Thus, once I know that (20) is satisﬁed, we have that as α increases, the
net beneﬁt of joining the union increases for the unskilled worker. This is
due to the fact that as α increases, the competitive unskilled wage decreases.
Proposition 1 Once the unionization cost is smaller than the rent extracted
from the ﬁrm, the union is formed. Then there are 2 threshold values for α:
α∗ and α∗∗.Then, in order to have a union formed by skilled and unskilled
workers, we need that α ∈ [α∗∗,α∗]. When α > α∗, the union is formed only
by unskilled workers.
6The number of workers employed by ﬁrms that choose ni(c) = n∗
iequals n∗
i = φi(c)Ni.




123.2 Union eﬀective Bargain Power
The share of the ﬁrms proﬁts that unions extract during the bargain process
is equal to β(1−γ). Thus, it can be viewed as the "eﬀective" union bargain
power, while [1 − β(1 − γ)] is the share of the proﬁts that the ﬁrms obtain
in the bargaining.
The eﬀective bargain power aﬀects unions in two diﬀerent ways. The ﬁrst
eﬀect is in the union formation, because β(1−γ) aﬀects c and through it the
number of ﬁrms that are unionized, that is.
dc
dβ(1 − γ)





Equation (21) shows us that when β(1 − γ) > 1
2, an increase in β(1 − γ)
decreases c. On the other hand, when β(1 − γ) < 1
2, an increase in β(1 − γ)
increases c. Therefore, an increase in β(1 − γ) reduces unionization when
the eﬀective bargain power of the union is bigger than the ﬁrms. While an
increase in β(1 − γ) increases c when the ﬁrm has a bigger eﬀective bargain
power8.
The second eﬀect is on the workers decision to be a union member or not.
As the workers divide the total rents extracted among themselves, higher
rents imply higher union wages. We can see this below:
The bargain power(β) and the "punishment" that the union can impose
on ﬁrms (1 − γ) have a positive eﬀect on the net beneﬁt of joining a union
for both workers9.
With this in hands is easy to see that the "eﬀective" union bargain power
has the same positive impact.
dZi
dβ(1 − γ)
> 0 i = s,u (22)
3.3 Legal and Political Changes
In this model, legal and political changes with respect to unions are captured
by the parameter C, that gives the highest possible unionization cost in the
8As unions only exist in ﬁrms where ci < c, a decrease in c decreases unionization and
an increase in c increases unionization.
9However, the ﬁrms reaction against unions are stronger because a high β(1−γ) causes
a ﬁerce reduction in its proﬁts. Therefore, a high β(1−γ) incentive skilled workers to join
the union but aﬀects union formation negatively.
13distribution GC(c). It means that when we have a change in the legal and
political institutions that make the "environment" more hostile to unions,
the value of C goes up. The opposite happens if the change beneﬁts unions.
Therefore, a change in legal and political institutions against unions may
cause deunionization because an increase in C reduces the probability that
ci < c, therefore reducing the number of unions.
4 Algorithm and Some Simulations
Due to the analytical diﬃculties of solving the problem described above, the
use of computational methods is required. The algorithm used to solve it is
described below.
Firstly, I assume that the wages values for the skilled and unskilled work-
ers are given by ws0 and wu0. Then, I solve the competitive ﬁrms problem
and obtain the proﬁts π(n∗
s,n∗
u), which are used to form the three diﬀerent
regions previously described.
Then, I draw the unionization cost c1 designed for the ﬁrst ﬁrm in order
to ﬁnd in which of the three regions this ﬁrm is in.
Based on this ﬁrm’s problem, I observe whether the total labor demand
is equal to the total labor supply. If I have an excess demand for labor, the
wage must increase. If I have an excess supply of labor, the wage decreases.
Therefore the wages change until the labor market for skilled and unskilled
workers clears.
If the proﬁt obtained is greater than the entry cost, another ﬁrm entries
and receives its unionization cost c2. Then, I solve the problem of the two
ﬁrms and change wages until the skilled and unskilled labor markets clear.
After that, I verify if the expected proﬁt is higher than the entry cost. If it is
higher, another ﬁrm will enter and the procedure continues in the same way,
until the point in which that entry cost is higher than the expected proﬁts.
It is important to note that the values that the unionization cost ci take
in the region 2, where the ﬁrm can increase its proﬁt by changing the labor
employment in order to avoid the union existence, are important in this
process, because they will determine the proﬁt of that ﬁrm.
144.1 Functional Forms
I adopt the same production function used in the previous section: F (ns,nu) =
Anα
sn1−α−θ
u . With this production function, I have that both types of work-
ers are essential to production, as required before. The degree of diminishing
returns to the plant level is represented by θ.
The relative productivity between skilled and unskilled workers is repre-
sented by α. As α increases, the skilled worker increases its productivity gap
to the unskilled.
It is also necessary to choose a distribution for the stochastic process that
generates the unionization cost ci. The uniform distribution is the one used.
More speciﬁcally we use a uniform distribution in the interval zero, capital
c, i.e., U ˜ [0,C].
4.2 Calibration and Simulations
In order to perform the simulations, I need to set values to the parameters
A, C, β, γ, α and θ.
The parameter θ that represents the degree of diminishing returns is set
to be equal to 0.15.
The parameter A, that represents total factor productivity, is set equal
to 80. This choice was made based on the total factor productivity obtained
from the BLS website for the late 70’s, that is around 80.
The total number of skilled and unskilled workers is the same and sets
equal to 400, Ns = Nu = 400.
We assume that the unionization costs are drawn from a uniform distri-
bution between zero and C. In order to study the impact of changes in the
legal and political institutions on unionization, we choose 2 diﬀerent values
for C. First I set C = 1.1. This value of C gives us a rate of unionized
workers around 35% of the total number of workers. Then, I make C = 2 in
order to see the impact of a change in legal and political institutions against
unions.
Instead of setting diﬀerent values of β and γ, I set three diﬀerent values of
β (1 − γ), that is the fraction of ﬁrms proﬁt that the union can extract. The
parameter β (1 − γ) is set equal to 1
3, 1
2, and 2
3. These three diﬀerent values
are used to analyze how the unions rent extraction can aﬀect the unionization
rate.
The variable that measures skill biased technical change is α. I start the
15study using α = 0.425, that gives equal relative productivity between skilled
and unskilled workers, and change it until α = 0.5.
The entry cost κ is set in order to have a number of ﬁrms equal to 20
(m = 20) for all the values of alpha. We run the program 100 times to
obtain some "consistence" because the results depend on the draws ci that
come from an i.i.d. uniform distribution. Doing this, we have a total of 2000
draws of c. To avoid "extra" stochastic eﬀects of the draws in the results,
we use the same 2000 unionization cost values(c) to the diﬀerent values of
α. The displayed results are the average of the wages(ws,wu, ￿ w, ￿ wu) and
unionization rates(UR) obtained during the 100 times that the program ran.
The simulations results are displayed in the tables below.
Table 1: Simulations results for β(1 − γ) = 1
3 and C = 1.1.
ws wu ￿ w ￿ wu UR
α = 0.425 26.793 26.793 28.372 - 36.20%
α = 0.44 27.637 25.954 28.375 - 36.20%
α = 0.45 28.199 25.391 28.380 - 36.20%
α = 0.4625 28.901 24.690 28.393 27.876 17.94%
α = 0.47 29.322 24.270 28.403 27.463 17.90%
α = 0.48 29.880 23.711 28.419 26.915 17.84%
α = 0.49 30.440 23.151 28.438 26.367 17.84%
α = 0.50 30.999 22.592 28.461 25.820 17.82%
As can be observed, the skilled worker competitive wage (ws) has a pos-
itive relation with α while the unskilled’s one (wu) has a negative relation.
This result is the standard one, because an increase in α increases the mar-
ginal productivity of the skilled worker and decreases the unskilled’s one.
The union wage bargained when both workers are in the union(￿ w) is very
stable, varying very little in all tables. On the other hand, if the skilled
workers are not part of the union, we have that the union wage ￿ wu, has a
negative relation with α. This is due to the fact that the wage bargained
￿ wu equals the unskilled competitive wage plus the division of the rents ex-
tracted from the ﬁrm. Therefore, it captures all the variation in the unskilled
competitive wage. Moreover, the union wage earned by the unskilled if the
skilled workers do not join the union is lower than the wage bargained by a
union formed by both types of workers10.
10This diﬀerence can be even higher if we drop the assumption that the bargain power
of the union is the same with and without the skilled workers as members, β = βu, and
that the punishment by the union is also the same, γ = γu.
16The rate of unionized workers remains pretty stable with any change of
alpha until the threshold value α∗. After this value, the rate of unionized
workers drops heavily, because the skilled workers leave the unions. This
result indicates the kind of phenomena that were previously expected: skill
biased technical change causes deunionization because the skilled workers do
not beneﬁt joining unions when α > α∗.
Table 2: Unionization Rates for diﬀerent β(1 − γ) and C.
C 1.1 1.1 1.1 2








α = 0.425 36.20% 37.07% 22.75% 17.28%-
α = 0.44 36.20% 37.07% 22.75% 17.28%
α = 0.45 36.20% 37.07% 22.75% 17.28%
α = 0.4625 17.94% 32.59% 22.74% 17.28%
α = 0.47 17.90% 18.93% 22.74% 8.54%
α = 0.48 17.84% 18.20% 22.73% 8.51%
α = 0.49 17.84% 18.16% 11.12% 8.49%
α = 0.50 17.82% 18.09% 11.07% 8.46%
Comparing the results under the assumption of 3 diﬀerent rent extractions
values(β(1 − γ)), equals to 1
3, 1
2 and 2
3, allow some interesting conclusions.
First, the higher the amount of rents that can be extracted, the stronger is the
ﬁrm’s reaction. It can be seen through the diﬀerence between unionization
rates with values: 1
3 and 2
3. In this exercise, this diﬀerence is around 14%
for low α′s and drops to around 6% for high α′s. Therefore, a lower rent
extraction by the union helps to increase the rate of unionized workers.
On the other hand, with a higher rent extraction the unions are more able
to "resist" to deunionization caused by the skill biased technical change. It
can be seen in the fact that when we have β(1 − γ) = 1
3, just after α = 0.45
the skilled workers left the union; when we have that β(1 − γ) = 2
3 the
skilled workers leave the union only when α is above 0.48. This fact was
shown in the comparative statics section where we had that: dZs
dβ > 0 and
dZs
d(1−γ) > 011.Therefore, we can conclude that when the rent extraction is very
high the unions are able to keep the skilled workers in the union even in the
presence of a huge productivity gap between skilled and unskilled workers.
Comparing the ﬁrst and last columns in table 2 allow us to see the im-
pact if changes in legal and political institutions against unions, that in this
11As here we are studying the changes in unionization rate when β(1 − γ) changes, we
can see that: dZs
dβ(1−γ) > 0.
17framework implies an increase in the value C. As can be observed comparing
the unionization rates(UR) in both tables the increase in C from C = 1.1 to
C = 2 causes a ﬁerce decrease in the rate of unionized workers.
It drops from around 37% to only around 17% for low α′s and from almost
18% to only roughly 8.50% for high α′s12. Then, is this framework changes
in the legal and political system aﬀects unionization.
The fact that the bargained wage ￿ w is very stable and the results that
also show a stable unionization rate when α varies depend heavily on the
assumption that the number of skilled and unskilled workers are the same,
Ns = Nu. Therefore, it is important to make some remarks. The unioniza-
tion rate (UR) and the union wage(￿ w) are steady across α′s only because
the above assumption. If the number of unskilled workers were bigger than
the number of skilled workers, both would decrease with increases in alpha13.
This would imply that as α increases, the rate of unionized workers(UR)
would drop gradually and also the union wage (￿ w). Therefore, some sensitiv-
ity analysis with respect to Ns and Nu are to be pursued as possible future
extensions.
5 Conclusion
This study describes a Stochastic General Equilibrium Model, where a DRS
sector interacts in a larger economy and can be aﬀected by unions. Firms
react to the possible presence of unions by changing their employment de-
cisions in order to maximize their proﬁts that are negatively aﬀected by
unions. Unions are formed when ﬁrms best response is to employ the neo-
classical amount of labor. Therefore, unions extract rents from the ﬁrms and
divide them among their members paying a unique wage. The unions are
formed only when the random cost of forming a union is smaller than the
rents that can be extracted.
Once the unions are formed, we analyze how SBTC aﬀects unionization
rate. We ﬁnd out that the skilled workers choose not to join the union
12Low α′s are the α values before skill biased technical change aﬀects the skilled workers
decision towards unions. And high α′s are for α values in which the skilled workers are
not in the unions anymore.













, that is smaller than zero if φu (c)Nu >
φs (c)Ns. Where n∗
i = φi (c)Ni is the number of workers i that are members of unions.
18depending on the magnitude of the increase in their productivity. Regarding
the unskilled workers, they will always join the union once a union is formed.
If the skilled workers do not join the union, the unskilled workers will receive
a wage smaller than the one they would receive if the skilled workers were
union members. But this wage is still higher than the unskilled competitive
one. Therefore, when skilled workers decide not to be union members, there
is an increase in the wage inequality.
I also conclude that the unionization rate is aﬀected by union "eﬀective"
bargain power. The rate of unionized workers is higher when union "eﬀective"
bargain power is lower. This happens because this lowers rent extraction by
unions and thus ﬁrms response against unions is not so strong. On the other
hand, with a lower "eﬀective" bargain power unions are more "exposed" to
SBTC, that can drive skilled workers away from unions easily.
Finally, we show that a change in institutional and political institutions
that make the environment more hostile against unions, reduces the rate of
unionization. This happens because this institutional changes make unions
formation more expensive, reducing their chance to exist.
Therefore, three forces can help to explain the drop in unionization in
this paper. The ﬁrst one is the reaction of skilled workers in the presence
of SBTC. The second one is the ﬁrms’ response against unions. The ﬁrms’
response is stronger when the unions try to extract higher rents, what causes
a low rate of unionized workers because of lower union formation. The third
one is a change in the legal and political institutions against unions because
it increases the union formation costs, decreasing the number of unions.
As pointed out before, some sensitivity analysis of the simulations seems
as a natural and necessary extension of the present work. Also a dynamic
model is a future and challenging extension of the present model. It would
enrich the analysis about the relationship between SBTC, rent extraction,
institutional changes and deunionization.
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